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In this paper, we explore how firms can manage their sourcing better by developing relationships not only
with their suppliers but also with their suppliers’ suppliers. We detail an empirical case study explaining how
the firm developed relationships with its suppliers and raw material suppliers via a collaborative center, the
sourcing hub. We then analytically model the scenarios encountered in our empirical work, and examine two
facets of upstream sourcing under uncertain demand scenarios: (a) firms can supply raw material directly to
their suppliers, and this may be beneficial for the firm and its suppliers, (2) firms can bring their suppliers
together at the sourcing hub, and the resulting cooperation between suppliers is beneficial for the suppliers
and the raw material suppliers. Overall, our work explores the market and economic conditions under which
active management of upstream sourcing can add value to supply chains.
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1. Introduction
Sourcing policies are an important element of supply chain strategy and can have short-term and
long-term effects on firm profitability. In the short term, they can affect purchase costs, delivery
costs and costs of rejection and rework. In the long term, they can affect warranty costs and product
life cycle costs, with further effects on a firm’s prestige and market share.
In most firms, organizational subsystems and processes related to suppliers are focused on the
firm and its immediate suppliers. However, we believe that with an increased focus on core business
activities and the outsourcing of non-core activities, firms have slowly distanced themselves from
some of the value in their supply network (like upstream raw material sourcing). For example,
in some contexts, like that of an automotive firm, a large number of direct suppliers of the firm
may buy their raw materials from the same sources. In this scenario, building close relationships
with suppliers’ suppliers may be valuable. When a firm brings its suppliers and suppliers’ suppliers
together, value is created by pooling knowledge: information about demand, process improvements,
raw material sourcing, and design complexity reduction is exchanged. This can help build an
efficient supply chain.
In this paper, we explore the concept of the sourcing hub as a value-enabling mechanism in
the upstream raw material supply chain by exploring when (i.e. under what market and economic
conditions) a firm’s active management of relationships with direct suppliers and raw material
suppliers can result in a more efficient supply chain. Our work is motivated primarily by a four year
long empirical investigation into the raw material supply chain practices of TDV (an automotive
OEM). At TDV, we found that the firm had developed relationships with its raw material supplier
and was actively managing its raw material supply chain. Is such management of the raw material
supply chain necessarily beneficial for firms? Our focus in this paper is to study this real and
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interesting problem by combining a case study with analytical modeling to explore conditions under
which raw material supply chain management can be beneficial.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we review the extant literature and establish our
motivation for this study. Then in section 3 we describe an empirical case study of TDV, a firm
that has implemented a sourcing hub for its raw material sourcing, to develop two hypotheses.
In particular, we explain how TDV has established relationship with its raw material supplier via
a sourcing hub, how this relationship has evolved, and how the buyers and supplier firms have
benefited from the hub setup. In section 4 we model the sourcing hub analytically and anchor it to
empirical findings to delineate under which conditions would a sourcing hub add value and under
which conditions would it not. We conclude in section 5 with a discussion of how firms can develop
a sourcing hub, the generalizability of our results, and future research opportunities.
2. Literature and Motivation
Our work is related primarily to the literature in the area of buyer-supplier relationships. Many
empirical and modeling studies span this literature. Two empirical studies related to our research
are those of Nishiguchi (1994, see specifically pages 96-97), who explored buyer investments and
their effects on supplier relationships, and Clark and Fujimoto (1991, see pages 67-96 in chapter
4), who explored how these relationships affect product development routines. Buyer supplier rela-
tionships may be directed at reducing the future uncertainty of costs, technology and information
(Bensaou and Venkatraman, 1995) and are affected by many factors including the complexity of
sourced parts (Masten, 1984; Novak and Eppinger, 2001), volume uncertainty related to compo-
nents (Walker and Weber, 1984), environmental factors (O’hUallachain and Wasserman, 1999),
and the strategic decision to in-source a component or technology driven by a quest for learning
(Monteverde, 1995; Ahmadjian and Lincoln, 2001). Outsourcing can help firms benefit from compe-
tition among suppliers (Baldwin and Clark, 1998) but does not work effectively without extensive
internal effort (Takeishi, 2001).
In papers focusing on mathematical modeling of buyer-supplier relationships, game theoretic
modeling is common, with a focus on contracts that can be drawn up between buyers and suppliers.
These include areas such as single or multiple sourcing (Baiman et al., 2000; Corbett et al., 2005;
Balachandran and Radhakrishnan, 2005) and parallel sourcing (Richardson and Roumasset, 1995),
in single or multiple periods (Swinney and Netessine, 2006; Tunca and Zenios, 2006) and replenish-
ment including vendor managed inventories (Cachon and Fisher, 2000; Aviv, 2001). Overall, one
stream of literature takes contract terms as given and then seeks to determine the optimal policies
(as in Eppen and Iyer, 1997), while a second stream takes optimal policies as given, but seeks to
determine if the contract terms can be modified so that the supply chain can benefit (as in Cachon
and Lariviere, 2005). Our work is closer to the second stream, and our focus is on detailing how
changes in relationships between buyers, their suppliers, and the raw material suppliers can affect
supply chain profits.
A recurring theme in the modeling and empirical literature is the focus on the immediate sup-
pliers of the firm, usually the downstream end of the supply chain. In this paper, in contrast, we
model the upstream end of the supply chain and focus on the raw material links in the supplier
network. In this vein, our paper is closest in motivation to that of Majumder and Srinivasan (2008),
who focus on the entire supply chain network.
In what follows, we explore two facets of the raw material supply chain of a firm. The first is
whether an OEM can benefit from managing the raw material supply chain, specifically, what hap-
pens when an OEM buys raw material for its suppliers. A few scholars have looked at this problem.
Signorelli and Heskett (1983) document that Benetton supported their policy of postponement
by buying yarn for their subcontracted manufacturing. Barnes and Morris (1999) study a plastic
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component at an automotive firm, its first-tier supplier, its second-tier supplier and raw mate-
rial supplier—four different firms in total. The authors posit that understanding the lower tiers is
important for better supply chain management, and that the automotive firm may be having prob-
lems due to its simple push-down approach to costs. The difference from previous work is that the
study makes the product pipeline, rather than the firm, the central focus of cost competitiveness.
Ellram and Billington (2001) document how an automaker facilitates the raw material supply to
its machine shop contractor. Such a step helps build price stability between the automaker and
the contractor. Wynstra et al. (1999) discuss how OEMs involve their first tier and second tier
suppliers (including raw material suppliers) in their new product development process to create
value. Our focus is similar, and we explore how relationships with raw material suppliers can bring
in opportunities for value creation.
Second, we explore what happens when an OEM initiates cooperation between its suppliers. Our
analysis shows that active management of upstream sourcing by the OEM can benefit all links in
the supply chain—the OEM, the component suppliers, and the raw material supplier. There is an
existing literature that relies on cooperative game theory as a tool to analyze supply chain con-
tracts. Kohli and Park (1989) analyze quantity discounts in the context of a two-person bargaining
problem. They explore how risk aversion and the bargaining power of each party can affect the
outcomes of bargaining. Whipple and Russell (2007) discuss three collaborative approaches - col-
laborative transactions, collaborative event management, and collaborative process management
that distributors and retailers can enter into for value creation. Reyniers and Tapiero (1995) inte-
grate quality with buyer-supplier contracts under a cooperative and a non-cooperative bargaining
scenario and focus on the contractual terms needed for a firm to ensure a consistent quality of
supply. Their main conclusion is that the quality of a supply chain is a decreasing function of the
proportion of warranty cost borne by the supplier, the inspection costs of the producer, and the
technology choices used by the supplier. Unlike these papers, we consider an assembly model where
suppliers, sourcing their raw material from a single raw material supplier, are supplying a buyer.
Our model differs from the above papers in that we explore how cooperation between suppliers,
managed by an OEM, can create value for the supply chain. Moreover, we model the interaction
with the raw material supplier, which is our key motivation in this paper.
3. The TDV Korea case study
TDV is a commercial vehicle manufacturer in South Korea. It produces heavy duty trucks includ-
ing cargo, dumpers, mixers, and other special purpose vehicles. TDV has 23 suppliers supplying
components for which steel is the major raw material. Currently, it purchases steel from a single
supplier and supplies the same to all its suppliers. It manages raw material prices, logistics, and
other related transactions via a web based system in a department which we call the sourcing hub
(this is our terminology, and is different from that of the firm, which is not reproduced due to
confidentiality reasons). TDV’s component suppliers work together with TDV and with each other
to (a) continuously improve the quality of components produced and (b) develop components for
new product introductions of TDV.
These processes at the TDV sourcing hub have evolved over time. Our studies revealed that
the current supply chain setup at TDV that focuses on collaborative initiatives was preceded by a
more transactional supply chain setup, which focused on cost reduction by supplying raw material
to the component suppliers. In what follows, we describe the two supply chain setups and discuss
the differences.
3.1. Direct Raw Material Procurement Setup at TDV
In the earlier years of its supply chain setup, TDV engaged in supplying a single raw material (steel)
to its 23 steel component suppliers. It purchased steel as a single buyer from the steel supplier,
Agrawal, Wassenhove, and De Meyer: Sourcing Hub
4 Article submitted to ; manuscript no.
Figure 1 A representative costing sheet from TDV
Note. Such costing sheets,developed at a component level, are linked online in TDV’s ERP system for material-
related changes. Note that the profit of 15% is calculated not on the raw material, but only on the labor, factory, and
administrative overheads.
and managed the logistics, physical supply, inventories of raw material, and disposal or salvage
of scrap/offcuts of steel generated in the manufacturing process at the suppliers. TDV’s contracts
with its suppliers stipulated that suppliers do not make any profit from raw materials, even when
they buy the materials themselves. A representative costing sheet is shown in Figure 1. For this
component, the profit element (the amount of KW 1589, row 4, column 7) is not calculated on the
raw material, irrespective of whether TDV is supplying the raw material or not. Therefore, the
supplier had incentives to let TDV manage the raw material transactions and incur the associated
transactional costs.
At other OEM firms, the component suppliers buy their own raw material and invest their own
capital in sourcing, storing, and processing it. In such a scenario of decentralized raw material
procurement, the OEM’s component level pricing usually includes profit on the raw material content
of the component, since the component suppliers’ capital is locked up in procuring the raw material.
However, in TDV’s direct raw material procurement setup, the suppliers did not need to invest in
buying or storing raw materials for components destined for TDV.
In this direct raw material procurement setup, let us explore what happens to the total landed
cost of any component. There are three effects. First, for any component, the raw material cost
for TDV is lower than, or at most equal to, the raw material cost that any of its suppliers would
incur. Second, for the same component, TDV does not pay any margin on the raw material, which
avoids double marginalization on the raw material and effectively lowers the cost. Finally, TDV
has to invest in managing the raw material transactions and use its own capital to purchase the
raw material. This increases the cost.
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Figure 2 The sourcing hub.
In day-to-day operations, managing the raw material supply process could be challenging. Our
interviews with TDV managers revealed that during the initial years, there were a lot of coordi-
nation issues with the suppliers. Many times the component suppliers used the constraints in steel
supply for their failure to deliver components - “You did not supply steel on time, so how could I
supply you components on time?”It was an adversarial relationship, where the focus was only on
reducing the landed cost of components to TDV.
3.2. The Sourcing Hub Setup at TDV
The raw material supply process at TDV has now evolved into a systematic collaborative process
involving its raw material supplier and its component suppliers. The centerpiece of this process is
the sourcing hub. Physically, the sourcing hub is deployed as a separate department within TDV,
which focuses on raw material sourcing and management.
The sourcing hub concept (Figure 2) is a critical departure from the typical supply network of
an OEM. It helps in two different ways. First, it helps develop upstream relationships with raw
material suppliers, as well as with direct suppliers. Second, it helps build collaborative relations
between suppliers by an increased understanding of raw material sourcing, and by an increased
understanding of the complexity of the supply chain.
What happens at the sourcing hub? On an annual basis, TDV and its suppliers come together
and develop the annual production plan, broken into half-yearly time-frames. One of the outputs
of this joint work with suppliers is a detailed raw material plan. The plan is discussed and agreed
upon between TDV and the raw material supplier. Quarterly and monthly plans are drawn and
on a rolling basis, contracts are settled for the following month. The contracts form the basis of
physical raw material delivery. TDV settles payments with raw material suppliers on a monthly
basis.
On a monthly basis, the suppliers work with each other to finesse the production of components,
including components for new products and those needing joint development. On a day-to-day
operating level, a lot of information is shared between the firm, the suppliers, and the raw material
supplier. TDV manages this information at the sourcing hub. The hub has sourcing individuals
working full-time on sourcing transactions, including logistics and negotiations. The day-to-day
transactions of the sourcing hub run on a web based system. The system has bill of material level
details of the raw material required for each component, as well as the details of current pricing
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between TDV and its raw material suppliers. The specific information available on the system
includes details of production plans for the coming months, new models, changes in drawings,
production schedules, quantity of components required, and the quantity and grades of raw material
required from the raw material supplier. This web-based information is used by component suppliers
as well as raw material suppliers, and is continually updated.
We have observed that there are two types of fixed costs in setting up the sourcing hub —startup
and ongoing. The startup cost relates to the detailing of raw material at the component level and
establishing a material database so that the raw material supply is streamlined. The raw material
level details at the component bill of material level are normally not a part of the day-to-day
operations at other OEMs. In order to develop such a database, the OEM has to collate accurate
raw material information—grades, weights and sources of material—for each component. This is
not easy, but once in place, the database is an invaluable source for raw material-related knowledge.
The ongoing cost consists of managing the sourcing hub—developing periodic (frequently
monthly) schedules, linking supply with the payment cycle to the raw material and component
suppliers, and auditing the inventory. Our study of the TDV sourcing hub shows that its ongoing
costs are insignificant compared to its cost savings—TDV manages the sourcing hub (for a single
raw material, for a single country) with just two full-time employees and part-time support from
one person in the finance department.
Today, on a weight basis, TDV buys around 95% of its input steel directly from its steel supplier.
These purchases are centered around the grades of steel that are used in most of its components,
and these purchases are aligned with the choice of specific grades selected for component design.
TDV also buys raw materials for other components, although steel supply chain management
remains its focus.
3.3. Hypotheses
The two supply chain setups of TDV present an interesting real world context to explore different
supply chain scenarios. It is particularly interesting to analyze why TDV and its raw material and
component suppliers acted the way they did, how these two setups (direct raw material procurement
and sourcing hub) differ from a decentralized raw material procurement setup, and what would
happen in a more generalized case. We note that TDV did not employ the option of a decentralized
raw material procurement; it moved from a setup of direct raw material procurement to the sourcing
hub setup. In what follows, we first present two hypotheses from the TDV case study, and then
explore the TDV supply chain setups analytically.
We studied the supply chain at TDV in detail by making multiple visits to the component
suppliers and the raw material supplier. The component suppliers held the view that if they buy
steel directly from the steel supplier, their purchase price would be higher. We checked the market
prices of steel and found that there was a difference of 7% between the supply prices of steel to
OEMs and to other buyers. At first glance, this seemed to be the standard volume purchasing
benefit: the OEM buys more and gets a lower price. But we questioned if there was something
we were missing – TDV is a truck manufacturer and is a smaller firm compared to Hyundai, who
produces cars in high volumes. If the volume purchasing arguments were correct, we would expect
to find the price of steel to TDV to be much higher than that to Hyundai. However, we found very
few differences in raw material prices to OEMs. Low volumes bought by TDV did not really make
a difference – what seemed to matter was that TDV was an OEM.
The steel supplier executives, in repeated enquiries and detailed discussions, emphasized the
importance of long term relationships and managing a stable production schedule over price pre-
miums. We queried the steel supplier executives at length and they replied, “You see, costs are not
dependent on individual customer volumes after a base level. As long as firms procure standard
products from us, our costs are really the same for TDV as for Hyundai. Costs are reduced by
Agrawal, Wassenhove, and De Meyer: Sourcing Hub
Article submitted to ; manuscript no. 7
having a detailed plan and leveled production – that only comes from our OEM customers, because
their plans do not vary too much for the next few months.” Essentially, the raw material supplier
argument seemed to be that the reduced costs emanating from stable plans and more information
from the OEM override the lower margins due to reduced prices to OEMs. For TDV, the raw
material comprises about 60% of its final product costs, and thus this price differential is important
for its business. The interesting issue was that the raw material supplier was selling product at
a lower price to a single buyer, instead of selling at a higher price to a multitude of buyers, and
still claiming that the practice was beneficial because of reduced information asymmetry in dealing
with the OEM. We can now propose our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 : As the raw material content in the product increases, developing direct pur-
chasing arrangements with the raw material supplier may be more beneficial for a buyer. This
opportunity may increase as information asymmetry in the supply chain increases.
We also talked to several TDV suppliers about the sourcing hub setup at TDV. Most of them
talked about the transition from a transactional relationship to a cooperative relationship over
time. A supplier remarked, “No, it is not merely a case of TDV providing the steel. TDV now also
provides information about production plans as well as design changes. This helps managing the
changes in tools and dies, as well as the workforce. You see, it is difficult, because our plans are
now transparent to our buyer – so it is easy for them to criticize if they need to. But we think
that this open relationship is better – many times TDV suggests good changes, and we also talk to
other suppliers, and that also helps.” Our sense was that the sourcing hub scenario was perceived
to be a better arrangement by TDV and all its suppliers. We now propose our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 : Developing cooperative relationships via a sourcing hub may be more beneficial
for a supply chain than transactional relationships (including the case of a buyer purchasing the
inputs). This opportunity may increase as information asymmetry in the supply chain increases.
Hypothesis 2 is saying that we should expect the direct purchasing arrangements (as in Hypoth-
esis 1) to be beneficial, but we should expect the sourcing hub scenario to be even better.
4. Modeling TDV’s Supply Chain
In this section, we analyze the two setups of TDV’s supply chain using parsimonious models. Our
main assumption comes from the observation that there are very few, and many times only a single,
raw material supplier to an OEM. TDV has a single steel supplier who supplies the raw material
needs of all its component suppliers. We abstract this empirical result in our models and consider
only a single raw material supplier. We model the raw material supply network as a single raw
material supplier, n component supplier, single OEM setup, exactly similar to TDV’s steel supply
chain setup.
Our focus is on exploring how the profits of agents in the supply chain change depending on the
situations of raw material sourcing and cooperation between agents. Although our context is the
automotive industry, the models are general enough to apply to any industry that has an assembly
process for the final product.
4.1. Decentralized Raw Material Procurement
We assume that all the agents in the supply chain are capacity constrained in the sense that the
overall demand q exceeds a pre-production capacity constraint q̂, but q is distributed such that it
is always greater than or equal to this pre-production capacity constraint, i.e. q≥ q̂. We model this
phenomenon by assuming that the single OEM faces a demand curve q= q̂+
(
a−Pm
b
)
in the market.
Here q̂ denotes the pre-production quantity that is guaranteed to sell, while 
(
a−Pm
b
)
denotes the
random, price sensitive demand that depends on the random variable  and price variable Pm. We
assume that E[] = α, V ar[] = σ2, and Pm = a− 1 b(q− q̂) is the production clearing price in the
market.
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The component suppliers see the same mean, but a higher variation in uncertain demand. The
RM supplier also sees the same mean demand as the component suppliers, but being further
upstream, sees an enhanced variation. Let qs = q̂ + s
(
a−Pm
b
)
be the demand curve seen by the
symmetric component suppliers, where s = β− (β − 1)E [] , and let qR = q̂ + R
(
a−Pm
b
)
be the
demand curve seen by the RM supplier with R = βs − (β − 1)E [s] , where β > 1 denotes the
information asymmetry between supply chain partners. A higher β indicates a higher degree of
information asymmetry. Thus, E[R] =E[s] =E[] = α, and V ar[s] = β
2σ2, V ar[R] = β
4σ2. These
assumptions model information asymmetry in the supply chain, with variability of demand increas-
ing as we move upstream in the supply chain away from the OEM. This is similar to assuming
that the bullwhip effect exists in the supply chain.
We assume the following sequence of events: (i) All the agents pre-produce q̂ where q̂ ≤ q, the
final quantity sold. (ii) The RM supplier announces a price schedule, and then the component
supplier i chooses the component price. (iii) The uncertainty is revealed and the OEM chooses
the final quantity q. (iv) Finally all agents complete the production of q− q̂, and the supply chain
realizes total sales of q.
The first step in the sequence assumes that all agents pre-produce the minimal safe stock q̂,
which is always guaranteed to be lower than the final quantity, yet they are not able to produce
more (before they know the final quantity q) because of production limitations. This assumption is
aligned with empirical observations - suppliers produce to an unconfirmed monthly production plan,
and many a time, get to know about the final production targets sometime during the production
month itself. Therefore quantity may be finalized at a point in time when there may not be enough
time or resources to complete the entire production (starting from zero).
The second and the third steps in the sequence assume that the RM and component suppliers
choose their prices before  is revealed but the OEM postpones its pricing decision after  is
revealed.
For the fourth step in the sequence, we further assume that since the agents do not know about
the final demand, they need to put together “reactive” or flexible resources in order to produce
the additional, random quantity that may be demanded. Due to information asymmetry in the
supply chain, as we go upstream, agents need to put in more of such reactive resources. That is to
say (i) there is a higher cost to fulfill the orders (q− q̂), because this quantity is revealed later in
the production process for all agents, and (ii) this higher cost of producing (q− q̂) increases as we
go upstream: the more is the uncertainty, the higher is the marginal cost of the extra production.
We model this phenomenon as follows: For producing (q− q̂), the OEM has a higher variable cost
proportional to σ, the component suppliers have a higher variable cost proportional to σβ while
the RM supplier has a higher variable cost proportional to σβ2. This formulation models the effect
of information asymmetry in that the variable costs of extra production increase with variability
in OEM’s demand () in the amount of information asymmetry (β).
The buyer’s manufacturing and assembly costs are vm. The n component suppliers supply unique
components, i= 1,2, ..., n, which go into the final product made by the buyer. We use the subscript
i to denote the component suppliers as well as their components. Component supplier i supplies
one component per unit of final product produced. For quantity q of final product sold in the
market,
∑n
i=1 q amount of input components are consumed by the buyer. Each unit of component
i consumes θi amount of raw material (abbreviated to RM henceforth). Component supplier i
supplies its components at price Pi to the buyer. The component suppliers get the RM from a
single RM supplier at rates ci, have variable costs vi, and incur fixed costs Fi in procuring RM
and processing it. The RM supplier has a cost cr per unit of RM produced. This setup is similar
to that of TDV, and is also aligned with our earlier assumptions – a single raw material supplier
supplies to many component suppliers, and these suppliers supply to a single OEM.
In this assembly system, we assume that the buyer sells q while the component suppliers as
well as the RM supplier try to supply components and RM required for producing q units of final
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product. The profit functions are then given as follows:
Buyer OEM:
Πm = q(Pm− vm−
∑n
i=1
Pi)− (q− q̂)kmσ,
Component supplier i:
E[Πi] =E[q (Pi− θici− vi)− (q− q̂)kiσβ]−Fi,
RM supplier:
E[ΠR] =E
[
q
(∑n
i=1
θi (ci− cr)
)
− (q− q̂)kRσβ2
]
,
where the proportionality factors km, ki, and kR can be thought of as agent specific scale factors
that modulate the effect of information asymmetry on the higher costs of reactive production.
(Proofs of all propositions are in the Online Appendix.)
Proposition 1. Decentralized RM Procurement.
(a) The optimal quantity in the decentralized chain is
q∗=

4 (n+ 1) b
(
a− vm−
∑n
i=1 (θicr + vi)
−σ (km +
∑
i kiβ+ kRβ
2)
)
,
(b) The firm level expected profits for the supply chain agents are
For the buyer: E[Πm] =
b
α
(E[q∗])2,
For Supplier i : E[Πi] = 2
b
α
(E[q∗])2−F i,
For RM supplier: E[ΠR] = 2(n+ 1)
b
α
(E[q∗])2.
4.2. Direct RM Procurement
In this section, we focus on the case where the buyer engages in direct RM procurement. The
buyer buys the RM directly from the RM supplier and gives it to the component suppliers (free of
cost, like TDV used to do). We use the superscript rm for the variables related to this game. The
component suppliers get the RM from the RM supplier (paid for by the OEM after the production).
The RM supplier supplies RM to all the component suppliers at a rate c per unit of RM (via the
OEM), and has a cost cr per unit of RM produced.
We model this phenomenon as a four step simultaneous move game. In the first step, all the
agents pre-produce a “safe”quantity q̂ where q̂ ≤ qrm, the final quantity sold. In the second step,
the n component suppliers as well as the RM supplier move simultaneously to determine their price
levels (of components and RM respectively). In the third step, the uncertainty is revealed and the
buyer OEM determines the market quantity. Finally all agents complete the production of qrm− q̂,
and the supply chain realizes total sales of qrm. The RM supplier and the component suppliers are
the leaders in this game.
Since the RM supplier and the component suppliers move simultaneously, the RM supplier
also sees the same mean demand and variation as that of the component suppliers. So qrms =
q̂+s
(
a−Pm
b
)
is the demand function for the component suppliers as well as the RM supplier. In line
with the observations in the case study, we model two additional conditions. First, the component
suppliers’ fixed costs change. They are reduced because the component suppliers are not investing
in the relationship with the RM supplier anymore. There is a saving on the associated transaction
costs of ordering and procurement. We denote the changed fixed costs of the component suppliers as
F rmi <Fi, i= 1,2, ..., n. Second, the buyer incurs costs to set up and operate the RM procurement,
to develop relationships with the RM supplier, and to manage the associated transactions associated
with managing the RM (such as delivering RM to the component suppliers, managing the financial
accounting associated with the RM delivery, and the scrap recovery). We denote this new fixed cost
Agrawal, Wassenhove, and De Meyer: Sourcing Hub
10 Article submitted to ; manuscript no.
of the buyer as F rm. The F rmi and F
rm terms mirror the concepts of information costs (Kleindorfer,
1979) or transaction costs (Williamson, 1985) in economics literature. We continue to assume that
for all supply chain agents, the variable costs of production increase with variability in OEM’s
demand () in the amount of information asymmetry (β). All other parameters remain similar to
those in the decentralized RM procurement scenario and are not repeated.
The game is akin to having (n+ 1) suppliers, with the last supplier being the RM supplier, and
the other n suppliers only having a value added component in their profit functions. The profit
functions are then given for buyer OEM as
Πrmm = q
rm(Pm−
∑n
i=1
Pi−
∑n
i=1
θic− vm)− (qrm− q̂)kmσ+F rm,
for component supplier i as
E[Πrmi ] =E[q
rm (Pi− vi− kσβ)− (qrm− q̂)kiσβ]−F rmi ,
and for RM supplier as
E[ΠrmR ] =E[q
rm
(∑n
i=1
θi (c− cr)− (qrm− q̂)kRσβ
)
].
The buyer’s choice is the quantity qrm under contracts with component suppliers.
Proposition 2. Direct RM Procurement.
(a) The equilibrium quantity is
qrm∗ = 
(
a− vm−σ (km +
∑
i kiβ− kRβ)−
∑n
i=1 (θicr + vi)
2 (n+ 2) b
)
> q∗
(b) The firm level expected profits for the supply chain agents are
For the buyer: E[Πrmm ] =
b
α
(E[q
rm∗
])
2−F rm
For Supplier i : E[Πrmi ] = 2
b
α
(E[q
rm∗
])
2−F rmi
For RM supplier: E[ΠrmR ] = 2
b
α
(E[qrm∗])2.
First, Proposition 2 says that qrm∗ > q∗ and therefore in the direct RM procurement scenario,
the component suppliers have higher expected profits compared to that in the decentralized RM
procurement scenario (since F rmi <Fi, and q
rm∗ > q∗, therefore E[Πrmi ]>E[Πi]). In this scenario,
the value for the component suppliers results from a change in component level pricing. When
component supplier i does not buy the RM, the working capital used in its business with the
buyer declines. Consequently, the buyer revises the purchase price to take into account the changed
working capital requirement of the component supplier. From a contract standpoint, the decen-
tralized RM procurement differs from the direct RM procurement because direct RM procurement
eliminates the double marginalization on RM, and is therefore more efficient. Second, note that
the direct RM procurement case is only beneficial for the OEM when its higher revenues (resulting
from increased supply chain efficiencies) are more than the additional fixed costs F rm.
4.3. The Sourcing Hub
In this section we formulate the sourcing hub problem in a five step hybrid cooperative/non-
cooperative game setting. This setup is similar to the setup under the decentralized RM procure-
ment in terms of the player profit equations, but the game and the sequence of events is different.
In the first step, all the agents pre-produce a “safe”quantity q̂ where q̂ ≤ qcoop, the final quantity
sold. Next, the RM supplier announces the price for the RM. Next, the n component suppliers
play a cooperative game between themselves and bargain over achievable joint profits. Then, the
Agrawal, Wassenhove, and De Meyer: Sourcing Hub
Article submitted to ; manuscript no. 11
uncertainty is revealed and the OEM chooses the final quantity qcoop. Finally all agents complete
the production of qcoop− q̂, and the supply chain realizes total sales of qcoop.
In the bargaining game between suppliers, which we model using the Nash bargaining solution,
we assume that the outside options of the suppliers are equal to their non-cooperative profits
(decentralized RM procurement), that is to say that the suppliers revert to playing the base-
case non-cooperative game if they fail to make the cooperation work. The parameters related to
uncertainty and information asymmetry are similar to that in the decentralized procurement setup
and are not repeated.
We empirically find that the fixed costs of the suppliers reduce in the cooperative scenario com-
pared to the decentralized procurement scenario, since all suppliers come together to deal with
issues related to production as well as RM. We denote the changed fixed costs of the component
suppliers as F coopi <Fi, i= 1,2, ..., n. Cooperation between suppliers leads to a more efficient, lower
cost supply chain, creating higher value. However, as we saw in the TDV case study, such coop-
eration does not “happen” between the suppliers, but is actively managed by the OEM via the
sourcing hub. Cooperation is not free – TDV incurs costs for managing the sourcing hub (to set up
and operate the hub, and to develop relationships between the component suppliers). In our model,
we denote this new cost of the buyer as F coop. This cost again mirrors the concepts of information
costs or transaction costs in economics literature.
The profit functions are then given for buyer OEM as
Πcoopm = q
coop(P coopm −
∑n
i=1
Pi− vm)− (qcoop− q̂)kmσ−F coop,
for component supplier i as
E[Πcoopi ] =E[q
coop (Pi− θici− vi)− (qcoop− q̂)kiσβ]−F coopi ,
and for RM supplier as
E[ΠcoopR ] =E
[
qcoop
(∑n
i=1
θi (ci− cr)
)
− (qcoop− q̂)kRσβ2
]
,
where OEM’s choice is quantity qcoop under contracts with component suppliers.
Proposition 3. Proposition 3: Sourcing Hub: Cooperation between suppliers.
(a) The optimal quantity in the sourcing hub scenario is:
qcoop∗ =

8b
(
a− vm−
∑n
i=1 (θicr + vi)
−σ (km +
∑
i kiβ+ kRβ
2)
)
.
(b) The firm level expected profits for the supply chain agents are
For the buyer: E[Πcoopm ] =
b
α
(E[qcoop∗])2−F coop,
For Supplier i : E[Πcoopi ] =
b
α
(E[qcoop∗])2−F coopi ,
For RM supplier: E[ΠcoopR ] = 4
b
α
(E[qcoop∗])
2
.
(c) When n> 2, E[qcoop∗]>E[qrm∗]>E[q∗], and the game results in the following relations
E[ΠcoopαR ]>E[Π
rm∗
R ]>E[Π
∗
R], E[Π
coopα
i ]>E[Π
rm∗
i ]>E[Π
∗
i ] , i= 1,2, ..., n. (1)
Proposition 3 says that
• The component suppliers as well as the RM supplier in the sourcing hub supply chain have a
higher expected profit compared to the decentralized RM procurement or the direct RM procure-
ment scenario.
• All the agents - the buyer OEM, the component suppliers, and the RM supplier - have a higher
expected contribution from businesses.
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Note that the sourcing hub scenario is more beneficial for the OEM compared to the decentralized
RM procurement or the direct RM procurement scenario when the higher revenues (coming from
cooperation between suppliers) are more than the additional fixed costs incurred for deploying a
sourcing hub. Our empirical data shows that these fixed costs for TDV are very small compared
to 3-6% savings on the cost of goods sold achieved by deploying a sourcing hub. Further note that
direct RM procurement can be combined with the cooperative scenario at the sourcing hub. For
example, if we combine the direct RM procurement analysis with the sourcing hub analysis, then
the component suppliers’ expected profits will be b
α
(E[qcoop∗])2−F rmi , and we will get similarly
modified expressions for other members of the supply chain.
Empirically, we observe that the overall supply chain structure of TDV is getting closer to the
cooperative sourcing hub structure. The firm gets its suppliers together, shares demand information
and annual plans with them, and the suppliers, in turn, discuss cost reductions and design improve-
ments with each other in monthly meetings. However, it is not possible to precisely measure the
actual game being played by the agents. We can therefore assert that the actual industrial practice
(at TDV) is somewhere between the simultaneous move non-cooperative game in the direct RM
procurement scenario and the cooperative game between suppliers.
4.4. Analysis of the three scenarios
We now analyze the results of the two models of TDV’s supply chain scenarios, and compare it to
the decentralized RM procurement scenario. Table 1 depicts the supply chain agents’ profits on a
common scale of the expected quantity sold by the OEM in the decentralized procurement (E[q∗]).
For notational ease denote Ω = ασkRβ(β+1)
4b(n+1)
. We note that the differences between various scenarios
depend on the number of suppliers, n, since the optimal quantity E[q∗] is a decreasing function of
n.
Table 1 Summary of firm level expected profits in different game scenarios.
Game Decentralized RM Direct RM Sourcing Hub
RM Supplier 2(n+ 1) b
α
(E[q∗])2 8
(
n+1
n+2
)2
b
α
(E[q∗] + Ω)2 (n+ 1)2 b
α
(E[q∗])2
Supplier i 2 b
α
(E[q∗])2−Fi 8
(
n+1
n+2
)2
b
α
(E[q∗] + Ω)2−F rmi (n+12 )2 bα (E[q∗])2−F coopi
Buyer OEM b
α
(E[q∗])2 4
(
n+1
n+2
)2
b
α
(E[q∗] + Ω)2−F rm (n+1
2
)2 b
α
(E[q∗])2−F coop
In the following propositions, we explore how the sourcing hub setup creates value for the agents,
and how does this value depend upon the supply chain variables such as the information asymmetry,
the number of suppliers, and the RM needed.
Proposition 4. Effect of RM and information asymmetry on the value of the sourc-
ing hub The difference in the expected profits of all agents - the buyer, the RM supplier, and the
component suppliers - in the decentralized RM procurement and the sourcing hub scenarios has
increasing differences in (θi, β).
Recall that component i consumes θi amount of raw material, and β denotes the information
asymmetry between supply chain agents. Therefore Proposition 4 says that managing RM sourcing
via a sourcing hub is more beneficial for firms who have a higher RM content in their costs.
Furthermore, as sourcing becomes more RM dominant (as θi increases), increasing information
asymmetry of demand (β) in the supply chain increases the value of the sourcing hub for all agents
in the supply chain.
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Proposition 5. Effect of number of suppliers on the value of the sourcing hub. The
difference in the expected profits of all agents - the buyer, the RM supplier, and the component
suppliers - in the decentralized RM procurement and the sourcing hub scenarios is increasing in n,
but has decreasing differences in (β,n).
Proposition 5 says that when buyers manage upstream RM sourcing, then an increase in the
number of suppliers has a greater effect on increasing the profits for all agents in the supply chain,
but this effect decreases with increasing information asymmetry (β).
We now revisit our hypotheses to explore how our modeling results can inform the empirical
observations and vice-versa. We first hypothesized that as RM becomes more important in the
sourcing of an OEM, the OEM may benefit from sourcing directly from the RM supplier. Our
interviews with the RM supplier of TDV indicated that the RM supplier may also be a winner in
this arrangement, even though there may be a reduction in the selling price of RM due to volume
purchasing.
We then hypothesized that an OEM may benefit more from developing cooperative relationships
with its suppliers and the RM supplier than from developing transactional relationships. Our
interviews with the suppliers indicated that the component suppliers find the cooperative mode of
the sourcing hub to be a superior way of working.
We see that our modeling results support these hypotheses only in part, and attract our attention
to more subtle aspects of managing the upstream RM sourcing. Summarizing the results from
Propositions 1 to 5, we can assert that
• When an OEM procures RM directly for its suppliers, such an arrangement can benefit the
component suppliers, but may not benefit the OEM in certain situations. The OEM can benefit if
it can manage the transaction costs of RM supplies (i.e. investment in procuring RM) to be lower
than the benefit arising from the reduction ensuing from direct purchase of RM. Otherwise the
OEM loses. Thus, Hypothesis 1 does not have full support from our modeling.
• Building cooperative relationships with component suppliers and RM supplier via a sourcing
hub is increasingly beneficial for all the agents as RM becomes important in sourcing. Thus,
hypothesis 2 is supported. Further, the agents benefit more from a sourcing hub as information
asymmetry increases.
• As the RM content in the sourcing increases, managing RM becomes more valuable for all
agents in the supply chain. Moreover, this increased value increases for all agents as information
asymmetry increases in the supply chain.
What is the extent of savings that can accrue to an OEM from managing its RM sourcing? The
exact answer depends on the relationship between the RM and the fixed costs of the OEM and the
suppliers. Our empirical research shows that direct RM purchasing and cooperative sourcing at the
sourcing hub lead to savings of 3%− 6% on the costs of RM for the OEM. This is a huge benefit,
considering that RM costs amount to over 50% of the cost of goods sold for automotive OEMs,
and the margins on the auto products are very low – industry level net profit estimate for auto
industry is 3.5% (Damodaran, 2013). Let us relate these empirical findings to our modeling results
for the sourcing hub. The difference in the expected profits of the OEM between the sourcing hub
and the decentralized RM procurement is
∆coopm =
b
α
(
(
n+ 1
2
)2− 1
)
(E[q∗])2−F coop.
Therefore the benefits from managing the RM sourcing depend on how efficiently a buyer manages
its fixed costs of RM sourcing, and also on the complexity of its upstream network (specifically,
the number of suppliers). Recall that TDV manages its sourcing hub – comprising 27 component
suppliers, and one RM supplier – with two full-time employees and one part-time employee. Since
the fixed costs of TDV are low, TDV manages to therefore capture significant savings from actively
managing its RM supply chain.
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5. Discussion - Deploying a Sourcing Hub
In this paper, we detail how buyers can recapture value from their supply networks by focusing
on their suppliers and their suppliers’ suppliers. We use our four-year empirical investigation to
motivate our research problem. We first detail the case study of an OEM , TDV, and explain how
this firm evolved its current supply chain setup (sourcing hub) in two stages. In its first stage,
TDV bought RM from a single steel supplier, and supplied the same to its component suppliers.
This helped the firm in running its supply chain at lower costs. In its second stage, TDV developed
the sourcing hub as an upstream entity in supply chains, focused on developing relationships with
its suppliers and its RM supplier. The sourcing hub was deployed at TDV as an organizational
department that facilitated interaction with and between upstream agents. Such interaction helped
disseminate information about market demand, production schedules, new product introduction,
and cost reduction.
We then use these empirical observations of TDV as assumptions for modeling a single buyer,
n component suppliers, single RM supplier setup. We explore two different setups: (1) buyers
procuring RM and supplying it to the suppliers and (2) buyers creating a sourcing hub – a center
for cooperation between suppliers. Our analysis and empirical observations show that managing
RM sourcing is more beneficial for firms who have a higher RM content in their costs, and who
have a large number of suppliers.
A wide range of industries can lend themselves to the sourcing models in this paper. Specifically,
our insights are more useful for such industries which have RM as an important part of the cost of
goods sold, and need to deploy assembly of components from multiple suppliers. Examples of such
industries are automotive, apparel and footwear, machinery, furniture, aerospace, and appliances.
On the other hand, sourcing hubs may not be very useful for industries such as electronics, IT,
chemicals, or entertainment. Because of the crisis/tough global competition in many (mature)
sectors, managers are forced to screen their supply chains continuously for potential cost savings or
other benefits. Oftentimes industry tends to go too far. In this case, squeezing the upstream supply
chain by transactional behavior with first tier suppliers may have led to inefficiencies. Revisiting the
upstream RM supply chain may provide opportunities for value addition for all agents in the supply
chain. This will not be true for all industries and will also not be true for all OEMs in any industry
but certainly for some (like TDV). Thus, for mature industries such as automotive, apparel and
footwear, machinery, aerospace etc., upstream RM sourcing management should be revisited and
our paper suggests a possible way to do that. Our empirical findings suggest that firms can achieve
3% − 6% savings in their cost of goods sold by deploying initiatives such as the sourcing hub.
The industry level net profit figures for automotive, apparel and footwear, machinery, furniture,
aerospace, and appliances are 3.5%, 6.6%, 7.7%, 8.7%, 6.7%, and 2.4% respectively (Damodaran,
2013). In such scenarios, upstream RM management should be investigated for opportunities of
value creation.
An interesting question is this : Why have we not seen more of this policy in practice? We contend
that in order to initiate direct RM procurement, the OEM needs to invest in creating a material
database at the component level. This is not easy since it means revisiting the bill of material
(BOM) for all components. A BOM comprises information about the raw materials, components,
and assemblies, as well as their respective quantities to manufacture an end product. Revisiting
the BOM is the only way to find out answers to questions such as (a) which current products of
an OEM require a particular RM? (b) what quantities of this RM are needed at the firm level?
(c) what is the quality (or grade) of the most important RMs needed at the firm level? (d) which
processes must exist at the RM supplier for supplying these RMs? Only after this information is
collated can one estimate how much RM of which quality (or grade) is needed. Our experience
with some firms who are deploying the sourcing hubs in their supply chains indicate that this is
an exhaustive and very time-consuming exercise. Additionally, when there might be many possible
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suppliers of the RM, or the choice of RM supplier might be subject to significant change over time,
then the return to the OEM of developing the infrastructure and relationships required to deploy
a sourcing hub might not be sufficient to justify the investment. We suggest that we don’t see such
hubs in many industries because of these features. Consumer electronics and food are examples of
such industries, where the benefits of adopting a sourcing hub scenario may be limited.
Overall, in scenarios where RM supplies are monopolistic (or oligopolistic) and relatively stable,
and the buyers have a larger dependency on RM in their cost of goods sold, deployment of sourcing
hub can help firms create value from upstream sourcing and recapture some of the value that
has been lost in the race to become a lean manufacturer. This value can come from developing
relationships with supply chain partners at the periphery of the firm - partners, who may not
supply directly to the firm, but may affect the knowledge of the firm and its operations, including
factors such as design complexities and costs. Firms can capture this value from their supply
chains by deploying the upstream entity, the sourcing hub. The sourcing hub helps in many ways.
Such a structure facilitates generation and use of RM sourcing knowledge by helping develop
collaborative relations with RM suppliers. Building a relationship with RM suppliers encourages
sharing of demand, production and design information. Sharing of information leads to improved
sourcing processes, which helps drive down costs of inputs. Thus, active management of upstream
RM sourcing can help managers capture more value from their upstream supplier network.
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